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Abstract. A collective obligation is an obligation directed to a group of
agents so that the group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve a given task.
The problem investigated here is the impact of collective obligations to
individual obligations, i.e. obligations directed to single agents of the
group. The groups we consider do not have any particular hierarchical
structure nor have an institutionalized representative agent. In this case,
we claim that the derivation of individual obligations from collective
obligations depends on several parameters among which the ability of the
agents (i.e. what they can do) and their own personal commitments (i.e.
what they are determined to do). As for checking if these obligations are
fulfilled or not, we need to know what are the actual actions performed
by the agents.
This present paper addresses these questions in the rather general case
when the collective obligations are conditional ones.
Keywords.
1 Introduction
This paper studies the relation between collective obligations directed to a group
of agents and the individual obligations directed to the single agents of the group.
We study this relation in the case when the group of agents is not structured by
any hierarchical structure and has no representative agent like in [1].
According to Royakkers and Dignum [2], a collective obligation is an obliga-
tion directed to a group of individuals i.e. a group of agents. For instance (this is
an example given by Royakkers and Dignum), when a mother says: “Boys, you
have to set the table”, she defines an obligation aimed at the group of her boys.
A collective obligation addressed to a group of agents is such that this group,
as a whole, is obliged to achieve a given task. This comes to say that a given
task is assigned as a goal to the group as a whole. In the mother’s example, the
goal assigned to the boys is to set the table and the mother expects that the
table will be set by some actions performed by her boys. Whether only one of
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her boys or all of them will bring it about that the table is set is not specified
by the mother.
In particular, one must notice that in the example, the mother does not oblige
each of her boys to set the table. This shows the difference between collective
obligations and what Royakkers and Dignum call “restricted general obligations”
which are addressed to every member of the group. For instance, “Boys, you have
to eat properly” is not a collective obligation but a restricted general obligation
directed to every mother’s boy.
Norman and Reed [3] use the terms collective group and distributive group to
make this dictinction. If distributive, a group is addressed distributively (“Boys,
you have to eat properly”); if collective, a group is being addressed as a collective
(“Boys, you have to set the table”).
What is particularly interesting with collective obligations is to understand
their impact on the individual obligations of the agents in the group, i.e. to
understand when and how the collective obligations are translated into individual
obligations. In the mother’s example, will the eldest boy have to carry the forks
and knifes, the second the glasses and the youngest the plates ? Or will the
youngest have to carry everything ?
One can notice that when the mother directs the collective obligation to her
boys, she does not direct (even implicitly) individual obligations to some or all
of her boys. More generally, we think that when an agent directs a collective
obligation to a group, it does not define individual obligations to some or all
agents of the group. The consequence is that, in case of violation of the col-
lective obligation, the only possible responsible towards the one who directed
the obligation, is the group as a whole: no precise agent can be responsible of
the violation of a collective obligation in front of the agent who directed that
collective obligation.
However, we think that when the agents of a group with no hierarchical struc-
ture receive a collective obligation, they may coordinate themselves to provide
a plan (or a task allocation), by committing themselves to make some actions.
These commitments imply individual obligations that some agents must satisfy.
Understanding how the collective obligations are translated into individual
obligations is the problem which is investigated here. We claim that the deriva-
tion of individual obligations from collective obligations depends on several pa-
rameters among which the ability of the agents (i.e. what each agent can do)
and their own personal commitments (i.e. what each agent is determined to do).
Latter on, by examining the actual actions of each agent of the group, one can
check if these obligations are satisfied or violated.
For instance, if all the boys keep on watching TV (thus, do not set the table)
then the collective obligation is violated. Notice that the collective obligation
will be violated too if the eldest one, who is the tallest and the only one who
can take the glasses, does not take the glasses, even if the two youngest boys
carry the forks, the knifes and the plates. As said previously, in this case the
whole group is responsible of the violation of the collective obligation. This can
be questionable, particularly by the two youngest boys in the last case since they
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will be all punished because of the eldest’s actions. However we will show that,
in this case, the eldest can be taken as responsible by the group because he was
the only one able to take the glasses.
This present paper addresses the question of the translation of a collective
obligation into individual obligations in the rather general case when the collec-
tive obligations are conditional ones. Roughly speaking, a conditional obligation
is an obligation which applies when a given condition is true. For instance, “If
it is sunny, set the table in the garden; else set it in the dinner-room” defines
two conditional obligations: if it is sunny, the boys have to set the table in the
garden but else, they have to set it in the dinner-room. In this work, we have cho-
sen Boutilier’s conditional preferences logic [4], [5], for representing conditional
obligations.
So, this work assumes that a set of conditional obligations is directed to
a group of agents. It also assumes a model of agents, describing each agent
of that group by its knowledge about the current situation, its abilities and its
commitments. It first defines a characterization of the obligations that the whole
group have to satisfy. Then, grouping the agents according to their ability, it
then defines the obligations that such sub-groups have to satisfy. Finally, given
the commitments of the agents, it defines their individual obligations. As for
checking if these obligations are satisfied or not, we have to consider the results
of the agents’ actions.
This work is based on the work of Boutilier [4], who addresses some of these
questions in the case of a single agent. In that paper, Boutilier assumes a set of
conditional preferences expressing a goal for a single agent. He then describes a
way to define the actual goals of the agent, given what it knows (or more exactly,
what it believes) and given what it controls. Like Boutilier mentions it, this work
can be applied to deal with obligations instead of goals (cf. also [6]). Our aim is
to adapt Boutilier’s work in the case of collective obligations. This will lead us
to enrich the model of agents by considering their commitments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 quickly presents Boutilier’s work
and in particular CO∗ logic and the model of agent he considers. Section 3 adapts
this work to the case of collective obligations and section 4 illustrates it on an
example. Finally section 5 is devoted to a discussion.
2 A solution in the case of a single agent
This section quickly presents Boutilier’s work in the case of a single agent. It
first recall the semantics of the logic used by Boutilier then it recalls the model
of agent he considers and its impact on the definition of goals.
2.1 CO and CO∗ logics and conditional preferences
Given a propositional language PROP , Boutilier defines CO logic whose lan-
guage extends PROP with two primitive modal operators: 2 and
←
2. Models of
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CO are of the form: M = 〈W,≤, φ〉 where W is a set of worlds, φ is a valua-
tion function 1, and ≤ is a total pre-order2 on worlds, allowing one to express
preference: v ≤ w means that v is at least as preferred as w.
Definition 1. Let M = 〈W,≤, φ〉 be a CO model. The valuation of a formula
in M is given by:
M |=w α iff w ∈ φ(α) for any propositional
letter α.
M |=w ¬α iffM 6|=w α for any formula α.
M |=w (α1 ∧ α2) iffM |=w α1 and M |=w α2 if α1
and α2 are formulas.
M |=w 2α iff for any world v such that v ≤ w,
M |=v α
M |=w←2 α iff for any world v such that w < v,
M |=v α
M |= α iff ∀w ∈W M |=w α.
Thus, 2α is true in the world w iff α is true in all the worlds which are at least
as preferred as w.
←
2 α is true in the world w iff α is true in all the worlds which
are less preferred than w. Dual operators are defined as usual: 3α ≡def ¬2¬α
and
←
3 α ≡def ¬ ←2 ¬α. Furthermore, Boutilier defines: ↔2 α ≡def 2α∧ ←2
α and
↔
3 α ≡def 3α∨ ←3 α.
Let Σ be a set of formulas and α be a formula of CO. α is a logical conse-
quence of (or deducible from) Σ iff any model which satisfies Σ also satisfies α.
It is denoted as usual: Σ |= α.
Boutilier then considers CO∗ [5], a restriction of CO by considering a class of
CO models in which any propositional valuation is associated with at least one
possible world. The CO∗ models are CO models M which satisfy: M |= ↔3 A,
for any satisfiable formula A of PROP .
In the following, we only consider CO∗.
In order to express conditional preferences, Boutilier considers a conditional
connective I(−|−), defined by:
I(B|A) ≡def↔2 ¬A∨ ↔3 (A ∧2(A→ B))
I(B|A) means that if A is true, then the agent ought to ensure that B.
An absolute preference is of the form: I(A|>)3. It is denoted I(A).
In order to determine its own goals, an agent must have a knowledge about
the real world, or more exactly some beliefs about the real world. Boutilier thus
introduces KB, a finite and consistent set of formulas of PROP , which expresses
the believes the agent has about the real world. KB is called a knowledge base.
Given KB and given a model of CO∗, the most ideal situations are char-
acterized by the most preferred worlds which satisfy KB. This is defined as
follows:
1 i.e. φ : PROP → 2W such that φ(¬ϕ) =W −φ(ϕ) and φ(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) = φ(ϕ1)∩φ(ϕ2).
2 ≤ is reflexive, transitive and connected binary relation.
3 Where > is any propositional tautology.
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Definition 2. Let Σ be a set of conditional preferences. Let KB be a knowledge-
base. An ideal goal derived from Σ is a formula α of PROP such that: Σ |=
I(α|Cl(KB)), where Cl(KB) = {α ∈ PROP : KB |= α}.4
Example 1. Suppose an employee who is requested to make sure that the pro-
posal for the financial management of the next year is written unless the statistics
are not collated. We consider a propositional language whose letters are s (the
statistics for the current year are collated) et fp (the proposal for the financial
management of the next year is written) and we consider the two conditionals
I(fp) and I(¬fp|¬s) which express that the proposal for the financial manage-
ment for the next year should be written, but if the statistics of the current year
are not collated, then it is preferred that it this proposal is not written. The pos-
sible worlds are: w1 = {fp, s}, w2 = {¬fp,¬s}, w3 = {fp,¬s}, w4 = {¬fp, s}5.
Because of I(fp), the worlds w1 and w3 can be the most preferred ones. But,
due to I(¬fp|¬s), w3 cannot be one of the most preferred. Thus, w1 is the only
one most preferred, i.e. w1 ≤ w2, w1 ≤ w3 and w1 ≤ w4. Furthermore, w3 ≤ w2
is impossible because of I(¬fp|¬s). Thus w2 ≤ w3. The models which satisfy
I(fp) and I(¬fp|¬s) are thus the following:
M1 : w1 ≤ w2 ≤ w3 ≤ w4
M2 : w1 ≤ w2 ≤ w4 ≤ w3
M3 : w1 ≤ w4 ≤ w2 ≤ w3
Assume first that KB1 = {s} (the statistics are collated). Thus Cl(KB1) =
{s}. Ideal goals for the agent are α such that ∀M M |= I(α|s). fp is thus an
ideal goal for the agent: since the statistics are collated, the agent has to write
the financial proposal. Assume now that KB2 = {¬s} (the statistics are not
collated). One can prove that ¬fp is now the ideal goal of the agent: since the
statistics are not collated, the agent must not write the financial proposal. This
is questionable and discussed in the following section.
Notice that this example is inspired from a scenario studied in [3]. Here, we
modified this scenario in order to get conditional obligations and we restrict it to
a single agent. Moreover, an extension of this scenario will be studied in section
4.
2.2 Controllable, influenceable propositions and
CK-goals
By definition 2, any formula α such that M |= I(α|Cl(KB)) is a goal for the
agent. Boutilier notes that this is questionable if KB is not “fixed” i.e. if the
agent can change the truth value of some propositions in KB. For instance,
4 In fact, Boutilier uses a non monotonic logic to deduce the default knowledge of the
agent. Here, in order to focus to ideal goals, we restrict to classical logic.
5 This way of denoting worlds is classical: for instance, w4 = {¬fp, s} is a notation to
represent w4 6∈ φ(fp) and w4 ∈ φ(s).
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in the second case of example 1, if the agent can collects statistics, it would be
preferable that he does so, and that he also write the proposal in order to achieve
the most preferred situation.
Boutilier then suggests, in the definition of Cl(KB), to take into account only
the propositions whose truth value cannot be changed by some of the agent’s
action.
Furthermore, it may happen that some formulas α which are characterized by
definition 2 define situations that the agent cannot achieve. Assume for instance
that in the first case of example 1, the agent cannot collect the statistics (for
instance, s/he does have permission to access the database): collecting statistics
cannot be a goal for the agent.
So, Boutilier introduces a partition of atoms of PROP : PROP = C ∪C. C
is the set of the atoms the agent controls (i.e. the atoms the agent can change
the truth value) and C is the set of atoms the agent does not control (i.e. the
atoms the agent cannot change the truth value)
For instance, if the agent has the access to the appropriate database and he
can use the dedicated software, then we can consider that he controls the atom
s. In any other case, we can consider that the agent does not control s.
Definition 3. For any set of propositional letters P , let V (P ) be the set of all
the valuations of P . If v ∈ V (P ) and w ∈ V (Q) with P and Q two disjoint sets,
then v;w ∈ V (P ∪Q) is the valuation extended to P ∪Q.
Definition 4. Let C and C respectively be the set of atoms that the agent con-
trols and the set of atoms that he does not control. A proposition α is controllable
iff, for any u ∈ V (C), there are v ∈ V (C) and w ∈ V (C) such that v;u |= α and
w;u |= ¬α. A proposition α is influenceable iff there are u ∈ V (C), v ∈ V (C)
and w ∈ V (C) such that v;u |= α and w;u |= ¬α.
One can notice that for an atom, controllability and influenceability are
equivalent notions. But this is not true for any non atomic propositions. Con-
trollable proposition are influenceable, but the contrary is not true.
Definition 5. The set of the uninfluenceable knowledge of the agent is denoted
UI(KB) and is defined by:
UI(KB) = {α ∈ Cl(KB) : α is not influenceable}
In a first step, Boutilier assumes that UI(KB) is a complete set, i.e. the truth
value of any element in UI(KB) is known.6 Under this assumption, Boutilier
then defines the notion of CK-goal:
Definition 6. Let Σ be a set of conditional preferences and KB a knowledge
base such that UI(KB) is complete. A proposition ϕ is a CK-goal (for the agent)
iff Σ |= I(ϕ|UI(KB)) with ϕ controllable (by the agent).
6 In a second step, Boutilier also examines the case when UI(KB) is not complete.
We will not focus on that case.
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Finally, Boutilier notices that goals can only be affected by atomic actions, so
it is important to characterize the set of actions which are guaranteed to achieve
each CK-goal. So he introduces the following notion:
Definition 7. An atomic goal set is a set S of controllable atoms such that for
any CK-goal ϕ, Σ |= (UI(KB) ∧ S)→ ϕ.
Example 2. Consider againΣ = {I(fp), I(¬fp|¬s)}. Assume thatKB = {¬fp,¬s}
(the statistics are not collected and the financial proposal is not written). As-
sume first that the agent can collect the statistics and also write the financial
proposal. Then UI(KB) = ∅. Thus, {fp, s} is the atomic goal set of the agent:
the agent has to collect the statistics and to write the proposal. Assume now
that the agent can collect the statistics but cannot write the financial proposal.
Here, fp is not controllable, thus UI(KB) = {¬fp} and the agent has no atomic
goal.
3 Collective obligations
Let us now consider that the conditional preferences are modeling collective obli-
gations which are allocated to a group of agents A = {a1, . . . , an}. The problem
we are facing now is to understand in which case these collective obligations
define individual obligations and how to check if they are violated or not.
Following Boutilier, we will assume that each agent is associated with the
atoms it controls and the atoms it does not control. But we extend that agency
model by assuming that each agent is also associated with the atoms it commits
itself to make true and the atoms it commits itself not to make true. These
notions will be formalized latter, but intuitively, let us say that an agent commits
itself to make an atom true if it expresses that it intends to perform an action
that will make that atom true. An agent commits itself not to make an atom
true if it expresses that it will perform no action that makes this atom true.
Assumption 1 In the following, the problem of determining individual obliga-
tions is studied assuming that the agents of the group have the same complete
beliefs about the current world.
3.1 Obligations of the group
Here, we extend the notion of CK-goals to the case when there are several agents.
For doing so, we first extend the notions of controllability and influenceability
to a group of agents.
Let ai be an agent of A. Let Cai be the set of atoms which are controllable
by ai (i.e. atoms which ai can change the truth value) and Cai be the set of the
atoms that are not controllable by ai. The extension of notions of controllability
and influenceability for a group of agent is given by the following definition.
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Definition 8. Let C =
⋃
ai∈A C(ai) and C = PROP \ C. A proposition α
is controllable by the group A iff, for any u ∈ V (C), there are v ∈ V (C) and
w ∈ V (C) such that v;u |= α and w;u |= ¬α. A proposition α is influenceable iff
there are u ∈ V (C), v ∈ V (C) and w ∈ V (C) such that v;u |= α and w;u |= ¬α.
This definition is obviously an extension of definition 4 to the multi-agent
case.
Example 3. Consider a group of agents {a1, a2} such that p is controllable by a1
and r is controllable by a2. We can show that the proposition (p ∨ q) ∧ (r ∨ s)
is not controllable by {a1, a2}. Indeed, if q and s are both true, whatever the
actions of a1 and a2 are, the proposition will remain true. However, p ∧ r and
p ∨ r are both controllable by {a1, a2}.
Since we assume the the agents share a common belief about the current
world, we can still consider a knowledge base KB as a set of propositional
formulas of PROP . And, like in the previous section, we assume that KB is
complete.
Like in [6], we can show that, given a Knowledge BaseKB, some propositions
are true and uninfluenceable in KB even if they are influenceable according to
definition 7.
Example 4. Consider a group {a1, a2} such that p is controllable by a1 and a2
and q is not controllable neither by a1 nor by a2. According to definition 7, the
proposition p∨¬q, even if not controllable, is influenceable by the group. Let us
now consider KB = {p,¬q}. p∨¬q is true in KB and, whatever the agents will
do, will remain true. We will say that p ∨ ¬q is uninfluenceable in KB.
This leads to the extension of definition 7 as follows:
Definition 9. Given a knowledge-base KB, a proposition α is influenceable in
KB iff there are u ∈ V (C) such that u |= KB, v ∈ V (C) and w ∈ V (C) such
that v;u |= α and w;u |= ¬α.
Notice that the previous example shows that a proposition, which is a logical
consequence of KB may be influenceable but uninfluenceable in KB.
We can thus introduce the following set:
Definition 10. Let UI(KB) be the set of logical consequences of KB which are
not influenceable by the group A or not influenceable in KB by the group A.
Definition 11. The group A has the obligation of ϕ towards the agent
who directed the collective obligation iff Σ |= I(ϕ|UI(KB)) with ϕ con-
trollable by A. It is denoted OAφ.
This definition is obviously an extension of definition 6 to the multi-agent
case. And we can check that it is also an extension, to the multi-agent case, of
the notion of ideal obligations given in [6].
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Thus, these obligations characterize the most preferred situation that the
group A can achieve, given what is fixed and given what the whole group can
control. But we can go further, by directing these obligations to the sub-groups
that can really fulfill them.
Definition 12. Let φ be a proposition. Let Aφ be the union of the minimal
subsets of A which controls φ7. We say that the sub-group Aφ has the obli-
gation of φ, towards A iff Σ |= I(φ|UI(KB) . It is denoted OAAφφ.
Thus, these obligations characterize the most preferred situation that the
group Aφ (a group which is the union of all the minimal sub-groups which
control φ) can achieve, given what is fixed.
Example 5. Let us now extend the example 1 to a group of agents and consider
three agents Alice, John and Tom who are requested to write a financial proposal
a scientifical proposal. The conditional preference which models this collective
obligation is: I(fp ∧ sf).
Assume that Alice is able to write the financial proposal while John and
Tom are able to write the scientifical proposal. Then we have:
O{Alice,John,Tom}(fp ∧ sp)
O
{Alice,John,Tom}
{Alice} fp
O
{Alice,John,Tom}
{John,Tom} sp
In other words, the group {Alice, John, Tom} has the obligation to write
the two proposals. The singleton {Alice} has the obligation, towards the whole
group to write the financial proposal, and the sub-group {John, Tom} has the
obligation, towards the whole group to write the scientifical proposal.
3.2 Agents commitments
Given an atom it controls, an agent may have three positions. The agent can
express that it will perform an action making this atom true. We will say that
the agent commits itself to make that atom true. The agent can also express that
it will perform no action making this atom true. We will say that it commits
itself not to make that atom true. Finally, it can happen that the agent does not
express that it will perform an action making the atom true nor expresses that
it will perform no action making it true. In this case, the agent does not commit
itself to make the atom true, and does not commit itself not to make it true.
These three positions are modeled by three subsets of the sets of atoms that
an agent controls. Com+,ai ⊆ Cai is the set of atoms ai controls such that ai
7 We could also choose to define Aφ as some of the minimal subsets of A which controls
φ. However, the whole study of the consequence of this alternative has not yet been
done.
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commits itself to make them true. Com−,ai ⊆ Cai is the set of atoms ai controls
such that ai commits itself not to make them true. Pai = Cai \ (Com+,ai ∪
Com−,ai) is the set of atoms ai controls such that ai does not commit to make
them true nor commits not to make them true.
These sets are supposed to be restricted by the following constraints:
Constraint 1 ∀ai ∈ A Com+,ai is consistent.
Constraint 2 ∀ai ∈ A Com+,ai ∩ Com−,ai = ∅
These two constraints are expressing a kind of consistency in the agent’s
model. By constraint 1, we assume that an agent does not commit itself to make
something true and to make it false. By constraint 2, we assume that an agent
does not commit itself to make an atom true and not to make it true.
Remark 1. The previous notions have been modeled in modal logic in [7], with
two families of modal operators: Ci and Ei, i ∈ {1 . . . n}. The operator Ei is the
stit operator ([8], [9]). Eiφ intends to express that the agent ai is seeing to it
that φ. It is defined by the following axiomatics:
(C) Eiφ ∧ Eiψ → Ei(φ ∧ ψ) (T) Eiφ→ φ
(4) Eiφ→ EiEiφ (RE) ` (φ↔ ψ) =⇒ ` (Eiφ↔ Eiψ)
The operator Ci is a KD-type operator and Ciφ intends to express that the
agent ai commits itself to make φ true. It is defined by the following axiomatics:
(K) Ciφ ∧ Ci(φ→ ψ)→ Ciψ (D) Ci¬φ→ ¬Ciφ
(Nec) ` φ =⇒ ` Ciφ
Given an atom l, and given these operators, an agent ai is facing three po-
sitions: CiEil, Ci¬Eil and ¬CiEil ∧ ¬Ci¬Eil (respectively, the agent commits
itself to make l true, i.e., the agent commits to make an action that makes l
true, the agent commits itself not to make l true i.e. the agent commits itself to
make no action that will make l true, and the agent does not commit itself to
make l true nor commits itself not to make it true).
In this present paper, we forget this axiomatics and we only consider the three
sets of atoms: Com+,ai , which corresponds to {l : CiEil}, Com−,ai , which cor-
responds to {l : Ci¬Eil}, and Pi, which corresponds to {l : ¬CiEil ∧ ¬Ci¬Eil}.
But we can check that, by the previous axiomatics, we can derive, as a theorem,
¬(CiEil∧CiEi¬l). This explains constraint 1. We can also derive, as a theorem,
¬(Ci¬Eil ∧ CiEil). This explains constraint 2.
For defining individual obligations, we only need to consider the positive
commitments (this assumption will be discussed in section 5). So, let us define:
Definition 13.
Com+,A =
⋃
ai∈A
Com+,ai
By this definition, Com+,A is composed by any atom an agent commits itself
to make true.
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Assumption 2 In the following, Com+,A is assumed to be consistent.
This constraint is imposed in order to avoid the case when one agent commits
itself to make an atom a true, while another agent commits itself to make that
atom false.
3.3 Individual obligations
We can now characterize the obligations that are directed to some agents of the
group, given the obligations of the group and given the agent’s commitments.
Individual obligations are defined by:
Definition 14. Let φ be a proposition such that OAφ holds. Let ai be an agent of
A. If there is some minimal {l1, . . . , lm} ⊆ Com+,ai such that |= l1∧. . .∧lm → φ,
we say that ai is obligated to satisfy l1∧ . . .∧lm towards Aφ. This is denoted
by OAφai (l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm).
Several remarks can be done on this definition. Let us suppose that the
whole group A has the obligation to make φ true, (thus the sub group Aφ
has the obligation towards A to make φ true). Let us suppose that there is
an agent ai such that there is some minimal {l1, . . . , lm} ⊆ Com+,ai such that
|= l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm → φ.
First, the set {l1, . . . , lm} is said to be minimal, in the sense that for any
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} ({l1, . . . , lm}− {lj}) 6|= φ. {l1, . . . , lm} can be viewed as a kind of
“prime implicant” of φ, because we do not want to derive individual obligations
with no link with the obligation imposed to the group. For instance, we can
have OA(fp): the group have the obligation to do a financial proposal. Let us
suppose that Tom commits itself to do the financial proposal and to wash its
car. In this case, with no minimality condition, we could derive that Tom is
obligated to do the financial proposal and to wash its car towards the sub-group
of agents “reponsible” for doing the financial proposal. But the washing of Tom’s
car has no link with the collective obligation of doing a financial proposal. The
minimality condition ensures that the individual obligations will not be “out of
context”.
If an agent ai commits itself to achieve some “actions” l1, . . . , lm such that
|= l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm → φ, then it has the individual obligation towards Aφ to make
l1 ∧ . . . ∧ lm true (notice that in [10], the agent has the individual obligation to
make φ true. The new formulation of individual obligation is more precise). This
intuitively represents the fact that, since the sub-group Aφ has the obligation
to make φ true and since ai commits itself towards the other members of Aφ
to make some sufficient conditions of φ true, then it has now the obligation,
towards Aφ to make those sufficient conditions true.
Finally, let us remark that such an agent ai belongs to Aφ, because it controls
some literals (in fact l1, . . . , lm) whose conjunction implies φ.
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3.4 Satisfactions and violations
For checking if the different obligations introduced previously are violated or
not, we must examine the results of the agents’ actions.
Let KBnext be the state of the world resulting from the actions of the agents.
Let φ such that OAφ.
– if KBnext |= φ then the collective obligation is not violated. We say that the
collective obligation is fulfilled.
– if KBnext 6|= φ then OA(φ) is violated.
The whole group A is taken as responsible of the violation, by the agent who
directed the collective obligation.
We consider Aφ. Since we have OAφ we also have OAAφ(φ). Thus, since
KBnext 6|= φ, this proves that OAAφ(φ) is violated too. And Aφ is taken
as responsible, by A, of this violation.
– let us consider all the agents ai such that there is some ϕ such that O
Aφ
ai (ϕ).
If KBnext 6|= ϕ, the obligation OAφai (ϕ) is violated too and ai can be taken
as responsible by Aφ of the violation of its commitment i.e. OAφai ϕ.
Moreover, if KBnext 6|= φ, ai can be taken by Aφ of the violation of OAAφ(φ).
4 Study of an example
In this section, we will illustrate the previous definitions by an example. Let us
consider a groupA of three agents named Alice (denoted by A), John (denoted by
J) and Tom (denoted by T ). That group is addressed the following obligations:
– if the statistics are collected, then the financial proposal and the scientifical
proposal should be written.
– if the statistics are not collected, then the financial proposal should not be
written, but the scientifical proposal should be.
Let us denote by s the fact “the statistics are collected”, by fp the fact
“the financial proposal is written” and by sp the fact “the scientific proposal
is written”. The previous scenario is translated into the following set of CO∗
formulas: {I(fp ∧ sp|s), I(¬fp ∧ sp|¬s)}.
Let us examine some scenarios:
1. let us suppose that KB = {s,¬fp,¬sp}. The statistics are collected, but
neither the financial proposal nor the scientific proposal are written. Let
us also suppose that CA = CT = {fp} (i.e. Alice and Tom can write the
financial proposal) and that CJ = {sp} (i.e. only John can write the scientific
proposal). So A controls both fp and sp.
In this case, UI(KB) = {s} and A has the obligation of fp ∧ sp, thus
A has the obligation of fp and the obligation of sp. Moreover, as fp is
controllable by both Alice and Tom, then {A, T} has the obligation towards
A to achieve fp. Finally, as John is the only agent which controls sp, {J}
has the obligation towards A to achieve sp.
Thus the obligations are : OA(fp ∧ sp), OA{A,T}(fp) and OA{J}(sp).
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(a) let us suppose that the agents do not commit themselves to anything.
Let us also suppose that Alice, John and Tom do nothing. In this case,
KBnext = KB = {s,¬fp,¬sp}.
As fp and sp are parts of the obligation OA(fp ∧ sp), the collective
obligation is then violated. A is taken as responsible of this violation.
Moreover, as {A, T} should have written the financial proposal (OA{A,T}(fp)),
{A, T} is taken as responsible by A of the violation of OA(fp). By the
same way, {J} is taken as responsible of the violation of OA(sp) by A.
(b) let us suppose that the agents do not commit themselves to anything.
Let us also suppose that Alice writes the financial proposal and that
John and Tom do nothing.
In this case, KBnext = {s, fp,¬sp} and KBnext |= fp ∧ ¬sp. The col-
lective obligation imposed on A is violated and the group is taken as
responsible of the violation of fp ∧ sp.
More precisely, OA(fp) is fulfilled because Alice wrote the financial pro-
posal. But OA(sp) is violated. As previously, {J} is taken as responsible
of the violation of OA(sp) by A.
(c) let us suppose that Alice commits herself to write the financial proposal.
In this case, Com+,A = {fp} and we can derive O{A,T}A (fp) (because
OA(fp) holds). Alice is obligated to achieve fp towards {A, T}.
Assume that Alice writes the financial proposal, that John writes the
scientific proposal and that Tom does nothing. In this case, KBnext =
{s, sp, fp} and all the obligations are fulfilled.
Assume now that Alice does not write the financial proposal, but that
Tom writes the financial proposal. Assume also that John writes the
scientific proposal. In this case, the collective obligation OA(fp ∧ sp) is
satisfied, OA{A,T}(fp) is satisfied too, but O
{A,T}
A (fp) is violated. Even if
the group fulfilled its obligations, the obligation of Alice towards {A, T}
to achieve fp is violated.
Let us finally suppose that Alice, John and Tom do nothing. In this
case, as KBnext = {s,¬sp,¬fp}, the collective obligation for the group
is violated. John has also violated its obligation toward the group A to
do sp. Finally, {A, T} has violated its obligation to do fp toward A and
Alice has violated its obligation to do fp toward {A, T}.
2. let us now suppose that KB = {¬s,¬fp,¬sp}, i.e. the statistics are not
collected and neither the financial proposal nor the scientific proposal are
written. Let us also suppose that CA = {fp}, CJ = {sp} and CT = {s}.
Thus A controls l, p and s.
As UI(KB) = φ, there are three obligations for A : OA(s→ fp), OA(¬s→
¬fp) andOA(sp). Thus we have :OA{J}(sp),OA{A,T}(s→ fp) andOA{A,T}(¬s→
¬fp).
Let us suppose that Tom commits himself to collect the statistics. As |=
s→ (¬s→ ¬fp), then Tom has the obligation towards {A, T} to do s, i.e.,
O
{A,T}
{T} s.
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Suppose now that Alice wrote the financial proposal (because she thought
that Tom would collect the statistics) but that Tom does not collect them.
Suppose also that John does nothing. Then, KBnext = {¬s, fp,¬sp}. In this
case, OA(¬s→ ¬fp) and OA(sp) are both violated by A. John violated also
his obligation OA{J}sp and {A, T} violated its obligation OA{A,T}(¬s→ ¬fp).
But Tom can be taken as responsible by {A, T} (and in particular by Alice)
of the violation of OA{A,T}(¬s→ ¬fp), because O{A,T}{T} s holds.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have presented a preliminary work about collective obligations,
i.e. obligations directed to a group of agents.
We have assumed that there was no hierarchical structure in the group, and
no institutionalized agent who represents the group like in [1]: the group is made
of real agents who may coordinate or not to act on the world.
In this work, the collective obligations are represented by conditional prefer-
ences. The first step was to determine the obligations of the group, given what
is fixed in the world and given what this group as a whole, can do. Then we
considered that, if the group is obliged to make A true, then it induces another
obligation to the very sub-group who control A: that sub-group is obliged, to-
wards the whole group, to make A true. These definitions of obligation are direct
extensions, to the multi-agent case, of one definition provided by Boutilier in the
single-agent case.
As for individual obligations, they are induced as soon as an agent commits
itself to satisfy, by one of its action, an obligation of the group. Checking if these
obligations are violated or not need to consider the state of the world obtained
after the agents’ actual actions.
This work could be extended in many directions.
For instance, concerning the agent’s model, it would be interesting to relate
the notion of commitment used here with the notion of proposition which are
“controllable and fixed” defined in [6]. We could also refine the notion of com-
mitment to the notion of commitment toward a group of agent. For instance,
Tom can commit himself to write the financial proposal toward Alice and John
et commit himself to wash the car toward his wife. Using this distinction could
refine the obligations derivation process. Moreover, we only consider that the
agents commit themselves to make a literal true. We could extend this to propo-
sitional formulas. But in this case, the derivation process is more complicated.
For instance, if an agent commits him/herself to do a ∨ b and a and b are im-
plicants for two different obligations, it is difficult to determine what the other
agents should do.
Secondly, one must notice that the notion of controllability taken here has
an important weakness: if l is controllable, then ¬l is also controllable. This is
questionable since having the ability to make an atom true does not necessarily
mean having the ability to make its negation true. For instance, even if one can
send emails, he/she cannot send emails back once they are sent.
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We are currently working on a more refined model of ability in which an
agent may control an atom but not its negation. In this refined model, we also
intend to take into account the fact that some atoms are controllable not by a
single agents but by a coalition of agents [11]: for instance, several agents (in
several areas) are needed to collect statistics. The impact of this refinement to
the previous work remains to be studied.
Notice also that the agents share the same beliefs about the world. What
happens when the group of agents does not share a common set of beliefs ? For
instance, Alice may believe that the statistics are not collected and act in this
way and Tom may believe that the statistics are collected and write the financial
proposal. To solve such conflicts, we could for instance use some kind of merging
methods which are used to build a common belief set from several belief sets
which can be contradictory [12,13,14]. Particularly, we suppose that the agents
beliefs are knowledge, in the sense that what they believe is true in the real
world. We could also suppose that the agents beliefs do not fit the actual world.
In this case, is an agent responsible of some obligations violations if it has acted
as its beliefs were true?
Concerning the definition of individual obligations, we only use the “positive”
commitments of the agents. But each agent can also express commitment of
the kind “I commit myself not to do the financial proposal”. As there are two
sets Com+ and Com− for each agent, there must be two kinds of individual
obligations. In our formalism, we express individual obligations to do something
but no individual obligations not to do something.
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